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Abstract
We study how organizational boundaries affect pricing decisions using comprehensive data from a large U.S. airline. We document that the ﬁrm’s advanced pricing
algorithm, utilizing inputs from different organizational teams, is subject to multiple
biases. To quantify the impacts of these biases, we estimate a structural demand model
using sales and search data. We recover the demand curves the ﬁrm believes it faces
using forecasting data. In counterfactuals, we show that correcting biases introduced
by organizational teams individually have little impact on market outcomes, but coordinating organizational outcomes leads to higher prices/revenues and increased deadweight loss in the markets studied.
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Introduction

Dramatic decreases in the cost of computation and data storage, along with algorithmic
innovations, have increasingly allowed ﬁrms to develop data-driven decision optimization
systems. Data and algorithms now play a key role in driving ﬁrm decisions across industries. This is especially relevant in the airline context where ﬁrms must match ﬁxed ﬂight
capacity with dynamically evolving demand. To solve this difﬁcult allocation problem,
airlines have developed sophisticated pricing systems over the last several decades. These
systems depend on inputs from multiple organizational teams. How airlines allocate decision rights across teams within the ﬁrm is not unique to the industry. Hotels, cruises, car
rentals, entertainment venues, and retailers have all adopted features of the airline pricing
model. Given the investments ﬁrms have made into these decision machines and their wide
use across industries, we may expect that prices are close to optimal.
In this paper, we study how organizational boundaries affect pricing decisions by leveraging a data partnership with a large international air carrier based in the United States.1
The granularity of the data allow us to understand the ﬁrm’s incentives to adjust prices
without needing to assume prices are optimally set. We show that the pricing at a sophisticated ﬁrm—one that employs advanced optimization techniques and has a heavy reliance
on automation—does not appear to react to some important market fundamentals. This includes not internalizing consumer substitution to other products, using persistently biased
forecasts, and not responding to changes in opportunity costs driven by scarcity. We show
that these “frictions” are introduced by separate teams within the ﬁrm. What happens to
prices and allocative efﬁciency if the ﬁrm does not face pricing frictions? Using a new technique to estimate demand and detailed forecasting data to infer the ﬁrm’s beliefs about the
demand it faces, we ﬁnd that correcting pricing frictions introduced by teams individually
does little to affect market outcomes. However, we also show that improving organizational
outcomes through the coordination of pricing inputs can result in increased price targeting
and higher revenues, but also higher dead-weight loss for the routes studied. Our results
highlight how non-coordinating teams with complementary functions can have signiﬁcant
1 The

airline has elected to remain anonymous.
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consequences on ﬁrm performance.
We begin by providing an empirical glimpse under the hood of dynamic pricing solutions used by airlines. In addition to observing prices and quantities, we also observe
granular demand forecasts, outputs of the pricing and allocation algorithms, the optimization code itself, and clickstream data that detail all consumer interactions on the airline’s
website. The core data cover hundreds of thousands of ﬂights spanning hundreds of domestic origin-destination pairs. We document the main organizational details of how pricing
decisions are made within the ﬁrm and provide insights on the incentives to adjust prices
over time in Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. We show that all major airlines have
similar organizational structures. Therefore, we believe our discussion and subsequent empirical ﬁndings likely hold for the airline industry broadly and perhaps for other industries
that have adopted similar pricing technologies and organizational structures.
In Section 4, we discuss data patterns that suggest the airline could be doing more with
its data. We show that prices do not necessarily adjust when the value of remaining capacity changes. This is caused by coarse pricing, or the use of “fare buckets." However,
the fact opportunity costs may adjust by hundreds of dollars without triggering a price adjustment suggests a mismatch between the fares chosen by one organizational team and
demand fundamentals. We establish that the forecasts maintained by a separate team respond to demand “surprises” too little and too late. These demand forecasts are biased
upward in two years of data. We establish that the pricing algorithm itself is biased by
showing that cross-price elasticities are not considered when setting prices. Finally, we
show that the ﬁrm chooses prices on the inelastic side of the demand curve—according to
their own estimates of demand—in more than half of the data sample. These frictions affect all routes, regardless of market structure, and are even more pronounced in competitive
markets (larger forecast bias and more frequent “inelastic prices” based on the ﬁrm’s beliefs of (residual) demand). Due to the additional complexity of modeling the competitive
interaction, our subsequent analysis focuses on routes where our carrier is the only airline
providing nonstop service.
In the second stage of our analysis, we quantify the impacts of these observed pricing
frictions on welfare. To do this, we estimate a structural model of consumer demand using a
2

recently proposed demand methodology (Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley, Schwieg, and Williams,
2021). In Section 5, we consider a model in which “leisure” and “business” travelers
arrive according to independent and time-varying Poisson distributions in discrete time.
Consumers know their preferences and solve discrete choice maximization problems. Each
consumer chooses among the available ﬂight options or an outside option. We provide
evidence to motivate some of our demand assumptions, including that consumers do not
appear to be betting on price and consumer arrivals are not endogenous to price.
We estimate the model using consumer search and bookings data. Aggregate search
counts calculated from the clickstream data inform the overall arrival process, and we
identify the price coefﬁcient using instrumental variables (see Section 6). The estimates
presented in Section 7 reveal meaningful variation in demand, with a general increase in
search for travel as the departure date approaches and substantial changes in the overall
price sensitivity of consumers over time. We discuss similarities and differences in model
estimates across routes.
Given the demand estimates, we then ask: what does the ﬁrm believe its demand curves
look like? We call these “ﬁrm beliefs” and we recover them in Section 8 using detailed
forecasting data and output from an algorithm that classiﬁes search and bookings as coming
from a “leisure” or “business” traveler. Relative to our baseline demand estimates, we ﬁnd
that the ﬁrm’s beliefs about their demand has more compressed demand elasticities both
within and across routes, more elastic demand near departure, and consumer types that
are “closer together" in terms of preferences. Using these recovered demand curves, we
conﬁrm our descriptive ﬁnding that prices are often too low: nearly 30% of observed prices
are below the optimal price even if capacity costs were zero.
In Section 9, we perform counterfactual exercises using a pricing model that closely follows the heuristic the ﬁrm uses. First, we isolate pricing frictions individually—removing
forecast bias and mismatched fare choices to the forecast, separately. We show that outcomes are largely unchanged because the pricing heuristic commonly defaults to the lowest
ﬁled fare because it expects that future demand can be satisﬁed with remaining capacity.
However, we also show internalizing complementarities across teams—correcting the forecast and inputting fares into the algorithm tailored to this forecast—yields very different
3

outcomes. Coordination guarantees that fares never drop below the optimal price if capacity costs were zero. This raises the distribution of fares offered and allows the ﬁrm to target
business travelers with higher fares. Revenues increase substantially—upward of 17% for
some markets. Dead-weight loss also increases by over 10%. The fact that that the ﬁrm
may be able to extract additional surplus but has chosen not to do so is puzzling. We argue
under-experimentation across organizational teams may play a role. We quantify the use
of experiments in the data. Although the ﬁrm may have long-run demand in mind when
pricing, we argue that observed forecast bias as well as bias in the composition of tickets
sold is inconsistent with this hypothesis. We hypothesize the ﬁrm may consider the implicit
cost of regulatory oversight or long-term competitive responses as alternative explanations.
Finally, we acknowledge that the observed pricing decisions may be optimal if the cost of
organizational change is sufﬁciently high.

1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature in behavioral industrial organization that examines pricing frictions, including DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) and Hitsch, Hortaçsu,
and Lin (2021) in retailing, Huang (2021) in peer-to-peer markets, Ellison, Snyder, and
Zhang (2018) in online retailing, and Cho and Rust (2010) in rental cars. We conﬁrm pricing frictions also impact ﬁrms that have pioneered advanced pricing algorithms. Our work
also contributes to research on miscalibrated ﬁrm expectations, as forecasts are persistently
biased (Massey and Thaler, 2013; Akepanidtaworn, Di Mascio, Imas, and Schmidt, 2019;
Ma, Ropele, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2020). Our work complements existing work, including
Blake, Nosko, and Tadelis (2015), who use a large-scale experiment to show sponsored
search resulted in negative returns at eBay, and Dubé and Misra (2021), who provide an
example where a ﬁrm (ZipRecruiter) has not priced optimally and pricing to the correct demand curve greatly increases revenue. In our setting, pricing to the correct demand curves
is insufﬁcient to greatly impact revenues if other pricing inputs are not realigned to this
change.
Our work also contributes to the literature in organizational economics. The adoption
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of information technology (IT) can increase productivity when complementary organizational and management practices are implemented alongside these investments (Bresnahan,
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012).2 However, organizations may not adopt technologies that increase productivity or revenues. Atkin, Chaudhry,
Chaudry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen (2017) study barriers to the adoption of cost-saving
technology. Sacarny (2018) study the slow take-up of revenue generating activities at hospitals. We estimate signiﬁcantly higher revenues with alternative pricing inputs, but this
outcome requires coordination on complementary tasks that can be difﬁcult in practice
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995; Siggelkow, 2001). Dessein and Santos (2006) use
a team-theoretic model and show that depending on the cost of communication, a ﬁrm
may choose to be rigid and specialized, e.g., airlines maintaining both pricing and revenue
management departments.3 We estimate the impacts of this decentralized organizational
structure and complement recent work by Aguirregabiria and Guiton (2020) and Filippas,
Jagabathula, and Sundararajan (2021).
Finally, this paper quantiﬁes the effectiveness of pricing heuristics proposed in operations research using airline data (Littlewood, 1972; Belobaba, 1987, 1989; Brumelle,
McGill, Oum, Sawaki, and Tretheway, 1990; Belobaba, 1992; Wollmer, 1992).

2

Organizational Structure and Division Responsibilities

We study the US airline industry, an industry that directly supports over two million jobs
and contributes over $700 billion to the US economy.4 In 2019 alone, 811 million passengers ﬂew within the United States.5 . In addition to being an important industry in its own
right, airlines have inﬂuenced the development of pricing technologies that are now used in
other sectors—for example, in hospitality, retailing, and entertainment and sports events.
Although the sophistication of these technologies has improved, many of the original yield
2 Brynjolfsson

and Milgrom (2012) provide an overview of this and related work.
additional theoretical work on organizational teams, see Che and Yoo (2001), Siemsen, Balasubramanian, and Roth (2007), Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008, 2015).
4 See https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/the-united-states–value-of-aviation/. July 1, 2021.
5 See https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/2019-trafﬁc-data-us-airlines-and-foreign-airlines-us-ﬂights-ﬁnal-full-year. July 1, 2021.
3 For
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management ideas described in McGill and Van Ryzin (1999) and Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2004) remain in place today.
Fares at our air carrier depend on the actions of managers in several distinct departments, and these departments do not explicitly coordinate their actions. Generally, decisions become increasingly granular, taking all previous departments’ decisions as given.
First, network planning decides the network, ﬂight frequencies, and capacity choices. Second, the pricing department sets a menu of fares and fare restrictions for all possible
itineraries. Finally, the revenue management (RM) department decides the number of seats
to sell for every fare-itinerary combination.
The RM group maintains the demand forecasting model and pricing algorithm, but does
not have control over the fares inputted into these algorithms. The pricing department sets
fares, but does not use the forecasting information.6 The forecasting model incorporates
historical information and current bookings information to predict ﬂight-level sales. The
pricing algorithm allocates remaining inventory given the fare menu. A commonly used
pricing heuristic in the industry is Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR-b), which
closely approximates the algorithm used by the ﬁrm. We provide additional details of
the EMSR-b in Online Appendix A and outline the algorithm here. EMSR-b belongs to a
class of static optimization solutions. Dynamics are removed because it assumes all future
demand will arrive tomorrow. The key trade-off, therefore, is to offer seats today versus
reserve them for tomorrow. Given all pricing inputs, it calculates the opportunity cost of
a seat and then assigns the number of seats it is willing to sell at all price levels. Lowest
priced units are assumed to sell ﬁrst. If expected future demand is high (low), it will restrict
(not restrict) inventory at lower prices today.
We demonstrate how inputs impact prices for an example ﬂight at our airline in Figure 1. On the vertical axis, we show the anonymized fare buckets decided by the pricing
department, with bucket one being the least expensive and bucket twelve being the most
expensive. The bottom right of the graph shows that the pricing department restricts the
6 Each

ﬁled fare contains an origin, destination, ﬁling date, class of service, routing requirements, and
other ticket restrictions. A common fare restriction decided by the pricing department is an advance purchase
discount, which speciﬁes an expiration date for a discounted fare to be purchased by. These discounts are
commonly observed seven, 14, and 21 days before departure.

6

Fare Bucket

Figure 1: Fare Bucket Availability and Lowest Available Fare
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Note: Image plot of fare availability over time as well as the active lowest available fare. Bucket1 is the least expensive; Bucket12 is
the most expensive fare class. The color depicts the magnitude of prices—blue are lower fares, red are more expensive. White space
denotes no fare availability. The white line depicts the lowest available fare.

availability of the lowest fares close to the departure date. There is relatively little variation
in prices for a given bucket over time. Given fares and the forecast (not shown), the white
line marks to lowest available price (LAP) offered to consumers. This is an output of the
algorithm maintained by the RM group. All ﬂights, regardless of market structure, ﬂight
frequencies, etc., are priced using the same algorithm.

2.1 Potential Pricing Bias with Uncoordinated Inputs
Pricing heuristics can be sensitive to algorithm inputs, which we demonstrate with a simple
example. Consider a ﬁrm selling 15 units over two sequential markets. Demand in the ﬁrst
period is equal to Q1 (p1 ) = 10−10p1 , and demand in the second period is Q2 (p2 ) = 10−p2 . If
the ﬁrm maximizes total revenues subject to the capacity constraint, the capacity constraint
will not bind, and optimal prices are equal to (p1 , p2 ) = (0.5, 5). This outcome can be also
obtained using the pricing and revenue management roles and the pricing algorithm EMSRb described above if the pricing department assigns prices to be {0.5, 5} and {5}, and the
RM group “forecasts” demand to be the functions above.
EMSR-b decides the number of seats that can be sold at each input price to ensure
that future demand can be satisﬁed. Lower prices are restricted only in situations where
future demand cannot be satisﬁed. In this case, ﬁve seats are needed for period two, and
7

the algorithm will appropriately allocate all seats to 0.5 in the ﬁrst period. Suppose instead
that the pricing department did not coordinate with the RM group and set prices equal to
{.2, .5, 5} and {5}. Note that all ﬁrst-period prices leave sufﬁcient capacity available for

the second period, which means EMSR-b will allocate all seats at the lowest price, 0.2.
Consequently, the heuristic will choose a suboptimal price even though the optimal price,
0.5, is included in the choice set.

2.2 All US Airlines have the same Organizational Structure
Our description of airline pricing is not unique to our airline—all airlines have the same
organizational structure and use similar pricing techniques. We show this by collecting job
postings information for all the major carriers in the U.S.7 We conﬁrm that Alaska, American, Delta, JetBlue, Southwest, and United have a network planning, pricing, and revenue
management department. As an example, JetBlue Airlines job postings show that the ﬁrm
has three teams related to pricing: Future Schedules, Revenue Management-Pricing, and
Revenue Management-Inventory. Job details delineate team responsibilities. The Revenue Management department at JetBlue has two separate teams, Pricing and Inventory.
The Pricing team has ownership over fares by “monitoring industry pricing changes ﬁled
through a clearinghouse throughout the day, and determining and executing JetBlues response.”8 The Inventory team uses “inventory controls to determine the optimal fare to sell
at any given moment in time to maximize each ﬂights revenue.”9 American Airlines managers describe how inventory controls are implemented in Smith, Leimkuhler, and Darrow
(1992)—they outline EMSR-b. Because all carriers have the same organizational structure
and use similar algorithms, we believe our analysis characterizes the entire industry, rather
than the perspective from a single ﬁrm.
7 Screenshots

of the job postings are available on request.

8 See https://careers.jetblue.com/job/Long-Island-City-Analyst-Revenue-Management-NY-11101/737962800/.
9 See https://careers.jetblue.com/job/Long-Island-City-Analyst-Revenue-Management-NY-11101/737962800/.
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July 1, 2021.
July 1, 2021.
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Data and Summary Analysis

We use data provided by a large international air carrier based in the United States. To
maintain anonymity, we exclude some data details. In Online Appendix B, we describe our
route selection criteria.

3.1 Data Tables
We combine several data sources, which we commonly refer to as: (1) bookings, (2) inventory, (3) search, (4) fares, and (5) forecasting data.
(1) Bookings data: The bookings data contain details for each purchased ticket, regardless of booking channel, e.g., the airline’s website, travel agency, etc. Key variables
included in these data are the fare paid, the number of passengers involved, the particular
ﬂights included in the itinerary, the booking channel, and the purchase date.10 Our analysis
concentrates on nonstop bookings and economy class tickets.
(2) Inventory data: The inventory data contain the decisions made by the RM group.
Inventory allocation is conducted daily. The data include the number of seats the airline is
willing to sell for each fare class in economy and aircraft capacity. We also observe output
from the pricing algorithm, including the opportunity cost of a seat.
(3) Search data: We observe all consumer interactions on the airline’s website for two
years. The clickstream data include search actions, bookings, and referrals from other
websites. Tracking occurs regardless as to whether an individual has a consumer loyalty
account or is logged in.
(4) Filed fares data: The ﬁled fares data contain the decisions made by the airline’s
pricing department. A ﬁled fare contains the price, fare class, and all ticket restrictions,
including any advance purchase discount requirements.
(5) Forecasting data: The air carrier forecasts future demand at granular levels. We
observe these predictions down to the ﬂight-passenger type-price level. In addition to the
baseline forecast, we also observe all managerial adjustments to the forecasts.
10 We

document facts using nonstop bookings, however, our measure of remaining capacity adjusts for all
tickets sold, e.g., connections, reward tickets, and consumers altering tickets, etc..
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3.2 Data Summary
Table 1 provides a basic summary of the nearly 300,000 ﬂights in our cleaned sample. We
focus on the last 120 days before departure due to the overwhelming sparsity of search and
sales observations earlier in the booking horizon.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Data Series

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev. Median

5th pctile

95th pctile

One-Way Fare ($)
Num. Fare Changes
Fare Changes | Inc.
Fare Changes | Dec.

201.3
9.3
50.4
-53.0

139.4
4.2
73.0
75.5

163.3
9.0
31.2
-32.2

88.0
3.0
2.2
-175.2

411.1
17.0
164.5
-4.3

0.2
0.6
82.2

0.7
1.4
21.4

0.0
0.0
90.0

0.0
0.0
36.0

1.0
3.0
102.0

1.9

4.8

0.0

0.0

9.0

Fares

Bookings
Booking Rate-OD
Booking Rate-All
Load Factor (%)
Searches
Search Rate

Summary statistics for the data sample. Fares are for nonstop ﬂights only. The initial load factor is the percentage of the number of seats
occupied 120 days before departure. The booking rates are for non-award, direct travel on nonstop ﬂights and for all trafﬁc on nonstop
ﬂights, respectively . The number of passengers denotes the number of passengers per booking. The ending load factor includes all
bookings, including award and connecting itineraries. The search rate is for origin-destination queries at the daily level. The number of
passengers is the number of passengers per request.

Average ﬂight fares in our sample are $201, with large dispersion across routes and
over time. Typically, prices for a particular ﬂight adjust nine times and double in 120 days.
Many adjustments occur at speciﬁed times, such as after expiration of advance purchase
discount opportunities. However, over 60% of price adjustments occur before the ﬁrst AP
fares expires. This is because inventory (and therefore, prices) is re-optimized daily.
In our sample, the average load factor is 82.2%.Although overselling is possible, we
abstract from this possibility because we do not observe denied boarding/no show information. Our notion of capacity will be actual plane capacity plus the number of seats the
airline is willing to sell over capacity (if any)—the observed “authorized” capacity.

3.3

Empirical Facts that Motivate Demand Assumptions

We summarize search and purchase patterns to motivate some of our demand assumptions.
10

The bookings data suggest that unit demand is a reasonable assumption. The average
passengers per booking is 1.3. In addition, the bookings data conﬁrm that overwhelmingly,
consumers purchase the lowest available fare even though several fares may be offered at
any point in time. We ﬁnd that 91% of consumers purchase the lowest available fare. Using
a separate data base that contains an indicator for corporate bookings under special fares,
we ﬁnd that corporate discounts are not a concern for the routes studied.
Bookings and searches are sparse, which motivates using a model model that accounts
for low daily demand. 60-80% of observations involve zero observed searches. The fraction
of zero sales is even higher (80% zeros). Zeros are not just present because we focus on
nonstop demand. The fraction of zero sales for any itinerary involving a particular ﬂight
ranges between 40-80%.
We adopt a two-type consumer model, corresponding to “leisure” and “business” travelers, because that is how the ﬁrm considers demand. The airline maintains separate forecasts
for these consumer types, and an algorithm classiﬁes every search and booking into these
two categories.11 We explore the predictions of this algorithm in Section 8.
Figure 2: Search and Booking Facts to Motivate Demand Model
1.0

1.0

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4
0.2
0.0

0.4
0.2

0

2
4
6
8
10
Number Re-Searching Same Itnerary

0.0

(c) Channel Booking Distributions
Percentage of Bookings

(b) CDF of Similar Itin. Searches

CDF

CDF

(a) CDF of Same Itin. Searches

0

2
4
6
8
10
Number DDs Searched for a Given OD
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3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0

Direct
OTAs
Agency

120 100

80 60 40 20
Days From Departure

(a) Empirical CDF of the number of days from departure searchers appear for a given itinerary. (b) Empirical CDF of the number of
departure dates a given searcher looks for. (c) Percentage of Bookings, across days from departure, for each Channel. Direct refers
to bookings that occur on the air carrier’s website, OTAs is purchases made on online travel agencies, and Agency are bookings made
through travel agencies.

Figure 2-(a) and (b) motivate our assumption that consumers solve static optimization
problems. We investigate the tendency for consumers to return to search for tickets for consumers who were not referred to the airline from other websites. Panel (a) shows the CDF
11 The

airline does consider additional types of passengers, but these categorizations are very small relative
to the two we consider. If we observe any searches or sales from other categories, we reassign them to be
leisure travelers.
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0

of number of times that consumers search for the same itinerary across days. 90% of consumers search for an itinerary (OD-DD pair) once. Panel (b) shows the CDF for the number
of different departure dates (for the same OD) that consumers search for within a cookie.
82% of customers search a single departure date. The average time lag between searches

for different departure dates is 45 days, which may suggest entirely different purchasing
opportunities (different trips).
Figure 2-(c) motivates adjusting our model for non-observed searches differently over
time. The ﬁgure shows the distributions of bookings across booking channels over time.
OTAs, or online travel agencies, closely follows the distribution of bookings via the direct channel. However, the agency curve—which includes corporate travel bookings—is
more concentrated closer to departure. We discuss this adjustment in Section 6.1. Note
that Figure 2-(c) shows some bunching in bookings immediately before advance purchase
opportunities expire. Although this may suggest consumers strategically time their purchasing decisions—they are forward looking—we ﬁnd evidence that supports certain days
before departure simply have higher demands. Using the search data, we split the sample
into two groups, one that includes routes that never have 7-day AP requirements, and one
that includes these requirements. We ﬁnd that that search activity (and purchases) bunch at
the 7-day AP requirement, regardless of their existence. Because arrivals increase regardless of price changes, we maintain the commonly used assumption that the market size is
not endogenous to price. Instead, we ﬂexibly estimate arrivals as a function of time and the
departure date that allows for this bunching.

4

Pricing Frictions Across Organizational Teams

In this section, we document several pricing frictions that suggests that the ﬁrm does not
price optimally.
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4.1 Coarse Pricing and Not Responding to All Available Information
Figure 3 demonstrates that the ﬁrm has access to, and indeed generates, payoff relevant
information that its pricing algorithms do not respond to. In panel (a), we plot the fraction of ﬂights that experience changes in price or marginal costs (the shadow value on the
capacity constraint as reported by the pricing algorithm) over time. The ﬁgure shows that
costs change at a much higher frequency than do prices. This occurs because of the industry practice of using a discrete set of fares (fare buckets). That is, it is possible that
marginal costs change by $1 but the next fare is $20 more expensive. Our analysis suggests
this friction is signiﬁcantly more important. In panel (b), we run a ﬂexible regression of
the change in costs on an indicator function of a price adjustment occurring. As the ﬁgure
shows, changes in marginal costs exceeding $150 only lead to price adjustments with 50%
probability. This may suggest alternative fares could lead to higher revenues.
Figure 3: Fare Adjustments in Response to Opportunity Cost Changes
(a) Fare vs. Shadow Price Changes
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Note: (a) The fraction of ﬂights that experience changes in the fare or the opportunity cost of capacity over time. (b) The probability of
a fare change, conditional on the magnitude in the change in the shadow value.

Prices are coarse both within a day and across days. At any point in time, each route
sees roughly a dozen different fare classes (such as the example ﬂight in Figure 1). Over
time, the median number of unique prices used for a particular fare is two (mean is three).
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4.2 Reacting to Surprises with Delay
The spikes in Figure 3-(a) occur at seven day intervals because ﬁrm reforecasts demand for
future ﬂights on a weekly interval. Outside of these periods, the ﬁrm reoptimizes inventory
given the forecast. The ﬁrm’s decision not to update their forecasts continuously may
be another source of pricing friction. We demonstrate via an example that information
exists which could improve/tune forecasting models. With the current system, reactions to
“surprises” occur too little and too late. In particular, demand forecasts maintained by RM
respond to demand surprises with delay, leading to missed opportunities both for the ﬂight
in question, but also for future ﬂights which are mistakenly thought to be over-(or under-)
demanded.
Figure 4: Reacting to Surprises: A Conference Example
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Note: All plots contain data series for ﬂights departing the date of a large conference (which moves both location and dates each year)
and the corresponding ﬂights in the surrounding weeks of the conference. (a) Shows the average load factor across ﬂights (b) Contains
the average lowest available fares across ﬂights (c) Has the average total expected seats to sell at a given point in time unconstrained by
the remaining capacity.

In Figure 4, we show average load factors, fares, and forecasted demand for a particular
route-departure date. This departure date is special because it involves a conference which
alternates both date and location each year. In addition to ﬂights on the conference date, we
include information for ﬂights on this route one week before and after the conference date
for comparison. As shown in panel (a), as soon as the location and date of the conference
is announced, around 200 days from departure, there is a sudden jump in load factor. The
ﬁrm’s revenue management software responds with delay (over a month) to the sudden
jump in bookings. Prices eventually increase dramatically as seen in panel (b). Panel (c)
shows that the forecasting algorithm, having observed the conference shock, then inﬂates
the forecast for the following week—to higher levels than the conference date. That is, the
14

0

algorithm incorrectly believes the next week will now also involve a conference. However,
in panel (a) we see that the ﬂights a week later contain no surprises—bookings follow a
similar pattern as other dates. Consequently, fares are too high for the non-conference
ﬂights and too low for a conference ﬂights.

4.3 Using Persistently Biased Forecasts
The forecasting model maintained by RM systematically not only reacts to surprises with
delay, it also persistently overstates future demand. We observe biased forecasts over two
years of data. In Figure 5, we plot the ﬁrms’ forecast against realized future sales. On average, the ﬁrm’s forecasts are biased upwards from the true distribution of future sales for
nearly the entire booking horizon. For the median observed forecast, the forecast is 10%
higher than the actual future demand, which is equivalent to predicting an extra 2.5 seats
will be sold. The forecast becomes more accurate toward departure because total remaining demand declines. Although the average forecast is biased upward, suggesting prices
may be too high, the forecasts appear misaligned with observed demand at different prices
(panel b). Low-fare transactions are underforecasted by 20%, and high-fare transactions
are overforecasted by 10%. This suggests the forecasting model may not accurately reﬂect
the actual composition of demand.
Figure 5: Firm Forecasting and Realized Sales
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Note: Forecasts and future sales are normalized by the aircraft’s total coach capacity. Plots show 7-day moving average to smooth across
strong day of week effects in the forecast sample. (a) Business traveler forecasts and realized sales. (b) Leisure traveler forecasts and
realized sales.

We also observe all managerial adjustments to the forecasts, which is also plotted in
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Figure 5-(a). We ﬁnd that user adjustments improve forecast accuracy, but the improvement
is small in magnitude relative to the total bias.
Forecasts are biased for all routes in the sample. Biases are slightly larger, both in percentage terms and in levels, for markets with competition. This may reﬂect the additional
complexity the ﬁrm faces when predicting residual demand.

4.4 Not Accounting for Cross-Price Elasticities
Dynamic pricing is computationally and theoretically complicated. Research in operations
research have offered heuristics (including EMSR-b) to solve such models, but this typically comes at the cost of abstracting from key market features. We show one important
market feature not captured by the pricing algorithm are cross-price elasticities.
Figure 6: Shadow Value and Price Response to Bookings with Multiple Flights
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Note: (a) The orange line denotes the average change in shadow value for a ﬂight when a sale at a given intensity occurs. The blue line
is the average change to shadow value when a sale occurs to another ﬂight at a given intensity. (b) This panel depicts the same as panel
a, but instead of changes in shadow value it depicts changes in price.

To show that pricing does not internalize substitutes, we subsample our data. We extract
observations that satisfy the following conditions: (i) the ﬁrm offers two ﬂights a day; (ii)
we include periods where demand is not being reforecasted (the observed as spikes in
Figure 3); (iii) the total daily booking rate is low (less than 0.5); and (iv) one ﬂight receives
bookings and the other ﬂight does not. By considering markets where the total booking rate
is low, the following intuition uses theoretical results in continuous time. In Figure 6-(a),
we plot the average change in shadow values for the ﬂights that receive bookings and for
the ﬂights that do not receive bookings (the substitute option) using ﬂexible regressions.
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In standard continuous time dynamic pricing models, every time a unit of capacity is sold,
prices jump, e.g., in Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994). This is also true in environments with
multiple products—any sale causes all prices to increase. Figure 6-(a) conﬁrms substitute
opportunity costs are unaffected by bookings. Panel (b) shows there is no price response.
This necessarily means that prices are not directly affected by competitor pricing decisions
in markets with competition.

4.5

Pricing on the Inelastic Side of the Demand Curve

We provide model-free evidence that the ﬁrm may be systematically underpricing according to its own expectations about demand. This bias is the result of incompatibilities in pricing inputs and the pricing algorithm. We use granular forecasting data (E Q )
that report the expected sales at the level of ﬂight ( j ), departure date (d ), days from departure (t ), forecasting period (s ), and price (p ). The difference between s and t deﬁnes how far in advance the forecast is constructed. For this exercise, we select observations such that s = t . Because we observe the forecast for multiple prices, we calculate the elasticity of demand, [(Q1 − Q2 )/Q2 ]/[(P1 − P2 )/P2 ], using the observed ﬂight price
as the base price along with the next highest price. We also compute the arc elasticity,
[(Q1 − Q2 )/(Q1 + Q2 )/2]/[(P1 − P2 )/(P1 + P2 )/2].

We ﬁnd that 34% to 52% of ﬂight observations are priced on the inelastic side of the demand curve using the ﬁrm’s forecasting data, depending on how elasticities are computed.
We consider whether differences in managerial ability inﬂuence outcomes (Goldfarb
and Xiao, 2011, 2016; Hortaçsu, Luco, Puller, and Zhu, 2019) by comparing the incidence
of pricing on the inelastic side of the demand curve across teams. We observe the identity
of the revenue and pricing analysts involved in managing pricing inputs, and estimate regressions of the form I(elasticity > −1)r,i = X r,i β + u r,i , where X contains team identiﬁers
as well as route characteristics. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant differences across teams,
however, even the best teams are associated with setting “inelastic prices” 30% of the time.
Higher trafﬁc markets (in terms of nonstop passengers) have a larger percentage of inelastic prices, and single-carrier markets see roughly 5% more frequent inelastic prices than
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competitor markets, holding passenger count constant.

5

Empirical Model of Air Travel Demand

In order to quantify the impacts of the pricing biases just discussed, we need to estimate
a model of air travel demand. We utilize both the demand model and estimation approach
of Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley, Schwieg, and Williams (2021). We consider the demand for
nonstop ﬂights for a particular origin-destination pair departing on a particular departure
date. The deﬁnition of a market is an origin-destination (r ), departure date (d ), and day
before departure (t ) tuple. The booking horizon for each ﬂight j leaving on date d is
t ∈ {0, ..., T }. The ﬁrst period of sale is t = 0, and the ﬂight departs at T . In each of the

sequential markets t , arriving consumers choose ﬂights from the choice set J (r, t , d ) that
maximize their individual utilities, or select the outside option, j = 0.

5.1 Utility Speciﬁcation
Arriving consumers are one of two types, corresponding to leisure (L ) travelers and business (B ) travelers. An individual consumer is denoted as i and her consumer type is denoted
by ℓ ∈ {B , L }. The probability that an arriving consumer is a business traveler is equal to γt .
We incorporate two assumptions to greatly simplify the demand system. First, we assume
that consumers are not forward looking and do not strategically choose ﬂights based on
remaining capacity, C j ,t ,d . This avoids the complication that consumers may choose a less
preferred option in order to increase the chances of securing a seat. Second, we assume that
when demand exceeds remaining capacity for a particular ﬂight, random rationing ensures
the capacity constraint is not violated.
We assume that the indirect utilities are linear in product characteristics and given by
(suppressing the r subscript)
(
u i , j ,t ,d =

X j ,t ,d β − p j ,t ,d αℓ(i ) + ξ j ,t ,d + ϵi , j ,t ,d ,

j ∈ J (t , d )

ϵi ,0,t ,d ,

j =0
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.

In the speciﬁcation, X j ,t ,d denote product characteristics other than price p j ,t ,d . Consumer
preferences over product characteristics and price are denoted by β , αℓ



ℓ∈{B ,L }

. For nota-

tional parsimony, we commonly refer to the collection {αB , αL } as α. The term ϵi , j ,t ,d is an
unobserved random component of utility and is assumed to be distributed according to a
type-1 extreme value distribution. All consumers solve a straightforward utility maximization problem; consumer i chooses ﬂight j if, and only if,
u i , j ,t ,d ≥ u i , j 0 ,d ,t , ∀ j 0 ∈ J ∪ {0}.

The distributional assumption on the idiosyncratic error term leads to analytical expressions for the individual choice probabilities of consumers (Berry, Carnall, and Spiller,
2006). In particular, the probability that consumer i wants to purchase a ticket on ﬂight j
is equal to
s ji,t ,d



exp X j ,t ,d β − p j ,t ,d αℓ(i ) + ξ j ,t ,d

.
=
P
1 + k ∈J (t ,d ) exp X k ,t ,d β − pk ,t ,d αℓ(i ) + ξk ,t ,d

Since consumers are one of two types, we deﬁne s jL,t ,d be the conditional choice probability
for a leisure consumer (and s jB,t ,d for a business consumer). Integrating over consumer
types, we have
s j ,t ,d = γt s jB,t ,d + (1 − γt )s jL,t ,d .

5.2 Arrival Processes and Integer-Valued Demand
We assume both consumer types arrive according to time-varying Poisson distributions. By
explicitly modeling consumer arrivals, we can rationalize low or even zero sale observations. Speciﬁcally, we assume: (i) arrivals are distributed Poisson with rate λt ,d , (ii) arrivals
are independent of price (as argued in Section 3.3); (iii) consumers have no knowledge of
remaining capacity; (iv) consumers solve the above utility maximization problems. With
these assumptions, conditional on prices and product characteristics, demand for ﬂight j is
equal to



q̃ j ,t ,d ∼ Poisson λt ,d · s j ,t ,d .
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With a random rationing assumption, demand may be censored, i.e., q j ,t ,d = min q̃ j ,t ,d , C j ,t ,d .

6 Estimation
6.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Because consumer arrivals are observed at the t , d level, we cannot estimate the arrival
process at the same granularity. Instead, we estimate the arrival process assuming a multiplicative relationship between day before departure and departure dates using the following
speciﬁcation,
λt ,d = exp(λt + λd ).

We pursue this parameterization because searches tend to increase over time (λt ) but there
are also strong departure-date effects (λd ). These parameters are route-speciﬁc.
In an ideal world, we observe all searches and estimate arrival rates using the sum of all
leisure and business searches, i.e., A Lt,d + A Bt,d . However, we do not observe all searches—
for example, a consumer who searches and purchases through a travel agency will result
in an observed purchase without an observed search. Figure 2-(a) suggests that we should
adjust for unobserved searches differently over time. We use the distributions of bookings and searches by passenger type as determined by the passenger-type classiﬁer. Using
properties of the Poisson distribution, we assign
A Lt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d (1 − γ̃t )ζLt )
A Bt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d γ̃t ζBt ),

where γ̃t is the ﬁrm’s beliefs over the probability of business (see Section 8 for more details)
and ζℓt is the fraction of bookings that do not occur on the direct channel for each consumer
type.12 That is, we use the relative fraction of L (B ) sales and searches across channels to
scale up L (B ) arrivals. This logic follows the simpler case with a single consumer type:
12 We

use time intervals early on because of sparsity in searches and sales. The largest time window
is composed of 14 days. Closer to the departure date, the intervals become length one. We smooth the
calculated fractions using a ﬁfth order polynomial approximation.
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if searches account for 20% of total sales, and we assume unobserved searches follow the
same underlying demand distributions, we can scale up estimated arrival rates by 5×. As
we are concerned about the accuracy of this assignment algorithm, We conduct robustness
to this speciﬁcation in Section 7.
We assume consumer utility is given by
u i , j ,t ,d = β0 − αℓ(i ) p j ,t ,d + FE(Time of Day j ) + FE(Week) + FE(DoW) + ξ j ,t ,d + ϵi , j ,t ,d ,

where "FE" denotes ﬁxed effects for the variable in parentheses. This ﬂexibility in the
utility and arrivals allows for rich substitution patterns, including seasonality effects, dayof-week effects, etc.
We parameterize the probability an arrival is of the business type as


exp f (t )

,
γt =
1 + exp f (t )

where f (t ) is an orthogonal polynomial basis of degree ﬁve with respect to days from departure. This speciﬁcation allows for non-monotonicites while producing values bounded
between zero and one.
Finally, we allow for the relationship between the unobserved demand shock ξ and
prices to change over the booking horizon using four blocks of time. For each block,
we assume the two unobservables are jointly normal. This captures varying managerial
intervention in pricing over time that we observe in the data.13

6.2 Estimation Procedure
We use a hybrid-Gibbs sampler to estimate route-speciﬁc parameters. With Poisson arrivals, we can rationalize zero sale observations while maintaining a Bayesian IV correlation structure between price and ξ. Our approach builds upon the estimation procedure
developed by Jiang, Manchanda, and Rossi (2009) by incorporating search, Poisson de13 If we instead estimate the model with ξ as a pure random effect, we estimate demand to be slightly more
inelastic compared to this speciﬁcation that allows for price endogeneity.
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mand, and censored demand. Additional details on the estimation procedure can be found
in Online Appendix C. A complete treatment can be found in Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley,
Schwieg, and Williams (2021).

6.3 Identiﬁcation and Instruments
One difﬁculty in estimating a model with aggregate demand uncertainty is separably identifying shocks to arrivals from shocks to preferences. We address this complication by
using search data. Conditional on market size, preference parameters are identiﬁed using
the same variation commonly cited in the literature on estimating demand for differentiated
products using market level data. The ﬂight-level characteristic parameters are identiﬁed
from the variation of ﬂights offered across markets, and the price coefﬁcients are identiﬁed
from exogenous variation introduced by instruments.
We use the carrier’s shadow price of capacity as reported by the revenue management
software, advance purchase indicators, and total number of inbound or outbound bookings
from a route’s hub airport as our demand instruments.14 The shadow price informs the
opportunity cost of capacity. The advance purchase indicators account for that fact that
prices typically adjust in situations where the opportunity cost is not observed to change
(see Figure 3). The total number of inbound or outbound bookings to a route’s hub airport
captures the change in opportunity cost for ﬂights that are driven by demand shocks in
other markets. For example, for a ﬂight from A to B , where B potentially provides service
elsewhere and is a hub, we use all trafﬁc from B onward to other destinations C or D . We
assume demand shocks are independent across markets, so shocks to B → C and B → D
are unrelated to demand for A → B . Thus, a positive shock to onward trafﬁc, out of hub B ,
will raise the opportunity cost of serving A → B → C or A → B → D . This propagates to
price set on the A → B leg.
14 For

a route with origin O and destination D , where P
D is a hub, the total number of outbound bookings
K
from the route’s hub airport is deﬁned as the following; i =1 QD ,D 0 . Where QD ,D 0 is the the total number of
bookings in period t , across all ﬂights, for all K routes where the origin is the original route’s destination.
If
PKthe route’s origin is the hub, we calculate the total number of inward bound bookings, which would be;
i =1 Q O 0 ,O . Where Q O 0 ,O is the total bookings from all K routes where the original routes origin is the
destination.
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7

Demand Estimates

We select a subset of routes for estimation (39 ODs) where our air carrier is the only airline
providing nonstop service. Our estimation sample includes routes with varying market
characteristics, including ﬂight frequency, importance of seasonality, and percentage of
nonstop and non-connecting trafﬁc. See Online Appendix B for additional information.
Figure 7: Model Estimates for Example Route
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(d) Demand Elasticities over Time
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Note: The horizontal axis of all plots denotes the negative time index, e.g. zero corresponds to the last day before departure. (a)
Normalized model ﬁt of searches with data searches. (b) Model ﬁt of product shares with empirical shares. (c) Fitted values of γt over
time, along with the probability a consumer is business conditional on purchase. (d) Mean product elasticities over time, along with the
least and most elastic ﬂights.

We ﬁrst present key ﬁndings for a single route and then summarize our results across
routes. For our example route, 88% percent of observations have zero product sales. It is
not unusual to have so many zeros. The number of nonstop ﬂights varies over the calendar
year; typically, A single ﬂight is offered. In Figure 7-(a), we show that our arrival rates
closely match the scaled up arrival data. The ﬁt is very good because our speciﬁcation
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includes d - and t -speciﬁc parameters. Arrival rates are increasing toward the deadline.
Panel (b) shows model and data bookings over time. Model bookings closed follow the
data and show a common pattern that purchases increase when prices rise. This suggests
demand becomes more inelastic, which we conﬁrm in the bottom panels. Panel (c) reports
our estimates of the probability of a business-type consumer. We commonly ﬁnd a significant change in the composition of arriving consumers over time, starting with a very low
probability of business and ending close to one. This pattern is consistent with the demand
estimates in Williams (2021). Recall that consumer types describe preferences, but not necessarily the reason for travel. In panel (d), we plot average ﬂight elasticities. Elasticities
start at -2.1 and increase past -1.0 closer to the departure date.
Table 2: Demand Estimates Summary across Markets
Parameter

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

25th Pctile.

75th Pctile.

Monday Arrivals
Tuesday Arrivals
Wednesday Arrivals
Thursday Arrivals
Friday Arrivals
Saturday Arrivals
Sunday Arrivals

3.653
3.001
3.274
3.785
4.395
3.085
4.286

2.882
2.260
2.433
2.760
3.432
2.412
3.393

2.645
2.030
2.075
2.650
2.995
2.175
3.426

1.484
1.352
1.472
1.685
2.007
1.285
1.764

5.432
4.827
5.127
5.685
6.119
4.490
6.466

Day of Week Spread
Flight Time Spread
Week Spread

32.53
74.99
52.35

19.61
59.29
61.90

28.19
45.45
35.12

17.55
34.70
21.98

39.81
95.95
56.62

Intercept

-1.095
0.286
1.764

1.274
0.167
0.736

-0.777
0.277
1.834

-1.405
0.165
1.169

-0.509
0.376
2.199

αB
αL

Note: Spread refers to the dollar amount a leisure consumer would pay to move from the least preferred time or day offered to the most
preferred time or day of week. Arrival parameters refer to the variation in search across ﬂight departure day of week.

In Table 2, we report variation in demand estimates across routes. The top panel shows
average arrival rates for different days of the week. The interquaratile ranges across routes
conﬁrm that average arrivals tend to be low. Friday and Sunday tend to be the busiest
travel days for the markets in our estimation sample. The next panel describes the spread in
willingness to pay (in dollars) for a leisure consumer to switch between the most and leastpreferred option (day of the week, time of day, week of year). Time of day preferences tend
24

to be stronger than day of the week preferences. Consumers generally prefer morning and
late afternoon departure times. We estimate that some weeks have systematically higher
demands than other weeks. This is not true for all routes, and it does not always reﬂect
seasonal variation in demand.
In Figure 8-(a), we plot arrival rates for the mean route as well as the interquartile
range over routes over time. Although levels of arrivals vary (the interquartile range spans
more than a doubling of arrivals), overall more consumers search as the departure date
approaches. In addition, demand tends to become signiﬁcantly more inelastic over time,
even though prices tend to price. This is shown in panel (b), which shows average ownprice elasticities for the mean, median, and interquartile range of markets. The drop off in
elasticities close to the departure date mostly reﬂect very signiﬁcant price increases after
crossing advance purchase discount opportunities.
Figure 8: Aggregate Arrivals and Elasticities
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(a) Estimated Arrivals aggregated over all 39 routes. (b) Estimated Own Price Elasticity of demand aggregated over all 39 routes

Over all markets observed, we estimate a mean elasticity of -1.05. We ﬁnd that 56%
of markets have inelastic demand. We further decompose these elasticities by route. We
ﬁnd that 82% of our estimated routes feature at least 10% of markets (departure date, days
before departure) with inelastic demand. Just above half of the routes have inelastic demand
on average. Inelastic demand tends to occur close to the departure date. We ﬁnd that 85% of
routes have inelastic demand in the ﬁnal ten days before departure. We ﬁnd no correlation
between elasticity and number of searches for the route; in fact, although many of the
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inelastic routes tend to be routes from a large city to smaller regional cities, we ﬁnd that the
smallest and largest routes by search volume have elastic demand. We ﬁnd a correlation
(26%) between estimated elasticities and the probability of business, as calculated from the
ﬁrm’s passenger assignment algorithm. That is, routes that tend to have a greater fraction
of business arrivals have less elastic demand than other routes.

7.1 The Impact of the Scaling Factor on Demand Estimates
We consider alternative speciﬁcations on our scaling factor ζ in order to understand how
changes in imputed market size affect our demand estimates. Our biggest concern is that
our scaling factor may understate the presence of price-sensitive consumers who primarily
shop with online travel agencies. For each route, we adjust our leisure scaling factor by
multiplying the original scaling factor by 1.5, 2, 3, 5 and 10. We ﬁnd that between 1.5 to
3 times the original scaling factor, our demand estimates are largely unchanged. For larger
scaling factors—between 5 and 10—we ﬁnd that demand becomes less price sensitive far
from departure and more price sensitive close to departure. The parameters most affected
by this scaling are the parameters governing the probability of business, γ. As we scale
up the leisure arrival process, our estimated probability of business falls. The change in
consumer types over time is reduced, however, we still estimate average elasticities to be
similar to the baseline model.

8

Firm Beliefs about Demand

We ask, What does the ﬁrm believe demand looks like? To answer this question, we use
detailed forecasting data and our demand model to infer the ﬁrm’s beliefs about demand.
We proceed in two steps. First, we recover ﬁrm beliefs on the arrival processes. We
assume the ﬁrm uses same model of consumer arrivals and that the total intensity of demand
is the same as our estimates, i.e., λt ,d = λt λd . However, we allow the composition of
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arriving customers to vary. For every route, we calibrate γt as
P
γt

beliefs

=P

ArrivalsBt

ArrivalsBt +

P

ArrivalsBt

,

where ArrivalsBt is the total number of arrivals classiﬁed as business for route r (L is similarly deﬁned) using the passenger classiﬁcation algorithm (we directly observe the algorithm as well as its outputs). With these estimates, ﬁrm beliefs on the arrival process are
λt λd γbeliefs
for business passengers, and λt λd (1 − γbeliefs
) for leisure trafﬁc. We label these
t
t

Poisson distribution rates λ̃Bt,d and λ̃Lt,d .
Second, we recover ﬁrm beliefs on preferences using the forecasting data, E Q . Recall
that we observe the forecast for period t , s days before departure. As an example, we
observe the forecast for a ﬂight three days before departure, forecasted 100 days before
departure. Therefore, the forecast was constructed (100 − 3) periods in advance. Deﬁne ∆
to be all combinations of differences between s and t , i.e.,
∆ = {(s − t ) | ∀t ≤ s ≤ T and 0 ≤ t ≤ T } ∈ N.

Whereas our previous analysis used the aggregate forecast (see Section 4.5), here we use
the forecasts at the consumer-type level, ℓ ∈ {L , B }.
We assume the ﬁrm also uses a Poisson demand model, with the same speciﬁcation
as ours. Because the ﬁrm considers single-product demand, we consider a single-product
setting when recovering beliefs. We transform the forecasting data to a cumulative forecast
that provides a direct analogue to our model,
Q̃ jℓ,k ,t ,d :=

X

E Q jℓ,k 0 ,t ,d .

k 0 ≥k

This is the forecast at fare buckets greater than or equal to k for consumer type ℓ. In
addition, we assume the forecasting model assigns λ̃ℓt ,d as the arrival process for each ﬂight
j ∈ Jd .15 Our assumptions imply that the unconstrained forecast is simply the Poisson
we could assume arrivals are λ̃ℓt ,d / J , so that each ﬂight receives 1/ J of arrivals. This increases
product shares and results in consumers estimated to be more price insensitive.
15 Instead,
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demand rate for the given index, i.e.,
Q̃ jℓ,k ,t ,d = λ̃ℓt ,d s jℓ,k ,t ,d (·).

If we take logs of the equation above and subtract the log of the outside good, we can use
the inversion of Berry (1994) to obtain the following estimation equation

log

Q̃ jℓ,k ,t ,d


ℓ
ℓ
− log(s0,t
) = log(s jℓ,k ,t ,d ) − log(s0,t
) = δ̃ℓj ,k ,t ,d .
,d
,d

λ̃t ,d

(1)

This is only possible because the forecasting data is at the consumer-type level, which
allows us to avoid using the contraction mapping in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and
Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006). The inversion allows us to impose similar restrictions
imposed in our model, i.e., the only difference in mean utility across consumer types is on
the price coefﬁcient.16
Deﬁning the left-hand side of Equation 1 above as δ̃, we obtain a linear estimating
equation of the form
δ̃ = X β̃ − α̃p + ξ + u ,
16 We

must also confront a data limitation in that our forecasting data is not necessarily at the t level, but
rather, at a grouping of t s the ﬁrm uses for decision making. The number of days in a grouping varies.
We address this data feature in the following way. Note that our demand model does not have t -speciﬁc
parameters—preferences do not vary by day before departure. Therefore, if Q̃ ℓ is the forecast for consumer
type i for multiple periods, the model analogue to this is
ℓ
Q̃·,t
∗

=

X
t ∈t ∗


λ̃ℓ·,t s·,tℓ (·) =

X
t ∈t ∗


ℓ
λ̃·,t

s·i (·).

We can simply sum over the relevant time indices for arrival rates because the time-index does not enter
within-consumer type shares, and the forecasting data assumes a constant price within a grouping of time.
This is important because we can then deﬁne consumer-type product shares as
P

ℓ
Q̃·,t
∗
ℓ
t ∈t ∗ λ̃·,t

= s ℓ (·).

Thus, we obtain the following inversion,

log P

ℓ
Q̃·,t
∗
ℓ
t ∈t ∗ λ̃·,t


− log(s0ℓ ) = log(s ℓ ) − log(s0ℓ ) = δ̃ℓ .
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(2)

where β̃ , α̃B , α̃L are recovered ﬁrm beliefs about demand. We include our estimated ξ
in the model, which is the mean of the posterior for that observation taken from our estimates. Thus, this approach also estimates a ﬁrm "ξ" that also differs across consumer
types through u . We set these residuals equal to zero after recovering ﬁrm beliefs. These
assumptions do not greatly impact our ﬁndings.
Figure 9: Firm Beliefs on Demand
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Note: (a) Comparison of product shares across consumer types, over time. (b) Estimates of γt versus those calculated using the passenger
assignment algorithm. (c) Forecasted demand across consumer types, over time. (d) Comparison of own-price elasticities over time. (b)
and (d) contain the 25th and 75th percentiles. Results are reported averaging over all observations in the data.

In Figure 9, we provide a visual summary comparing the model predictions using our
demand estimates (Model E) from those recovered from the forecasting data (Model B).
In panel (a), we plot product shares for both passenger types over time. Both Models
B and E produce similar preferences for business travelers, however, Model B results in
consumer types being "closer together" than under Model E, with leisure travelers being
more price inelastic than under our estimates. In panel (b), we plot the probability that an
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arriving customer is a business traveler. Model E places more mass on business travelers
and produces larger changes in the types of consumers arriving over the booking horizon.
Model B produces a small drop in business consumer arrivals very close to departure.
Panel (c) depicts expected demand. The signiﬁcant differences in γt creates a sizeable
gap in business passenger demand close to departure. Model E results in more purchases
close to departure. Finally, in panel (d), we plot own-price elasticities over time. Model
E produces elasticities that are increasing (toward zero) as γt increases, whereas Model B
results in mostly constant elasticities that then drop close to departure. This is due to the
probability of business being relatively ﬂat and consumer types being closer together in
terms of preferences.
Overall, the two models are quite different. Model B yields more compressed demand
elasticities where aggregate demand is slightly more inelastic well in advance of the departure date than compared to Model E. This is driven by the upward bias in the forecasting data along with reduced variance in the forecasts across ﬂights (relative to bookings).
Model E suggests there is more heterogeneity in demand across both ﬂights and routes,
with a more pronounced change in arriving consumer preferences over time.
We also estimate more ﬂexible speciﬁcations to examine whether the ﬁrm is learning
about future demand via their forecast, but we ﬁnd that learning does not play a large role
in shaping the ﬁrm’s beliefs. We allow for the ﬁrm’s beliefs (β̃ , α̃) to be speciﬁc to ∆ or
to ∆ × T . We do not ﬁnd evidence of learning about consumer preferences, as deviations
between between the belief estimates and model estimates do not converge across ∆ or
∆ × T . These ﬁndings are consistent with Section 4.2, which suggests that the ﬁrm may

be updating beliefs about demand incorrectly based on realized sales. This is likely due to
oversmoothing in the demand forecast methodology. We will abstract from both the ﬁrm’s
exact forecast methodology and from any learning about demand in our counterfactual
simulations. Instead, we will use the baseline ﬁrm belief estimates discussed above.
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8.1 How compatible are fares with the ﬁrm’s beliefs about demand?
Using Model B demand estimates, we assess the compatibility of prices with the ﬁrm’s
beliefs about willingness to pay. To do so, we consider a simple scenario: Suppose capacity
were sufﬁciently large so that capacity costs are zero. In this scenario, the ﬁrm can solve a
static pricing problem. What would be the revenue maximizing price? The optimal price
sets marginal revenue equal to zero, or M R Model B (p ) = 0. This price identiﬁes the lowest
price the ﬁrm should ever charge under Model B demand. We perform this calculation for
every ﬂight-day before departure combination.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant mismatch between prices and Model B demand. Only 49.6%
of observations involve fare menus, ﬁled by the pricing department, where the minimum
menu price exceeds the price that solves M R Model B (p ) = 0. Although we ﬁnd that 85.1% of
ﬁled fares are higher than the lowest price that should ever be charged (higher fare classes
are more expensive), 29.8% of observed prices are below the optimal price if capacity
were unconstrained. This implies that the pricing algorithm frequently selects prices that
are incompatible with the demand estimates recovered using the forecasting data. As the
simple example in Section 2.1 demonstrates, the pricing heuristic can be sensitive to inputs,
and our results suggest fare menus often contain prices that are too low, consistent with our
descriptive analysis in Section 4.5.

9
9.1

Counterfactual Analysis of Pricing Frictions
Counterfactual Models

We quantify the impacts of pricing frictions on welfare through several counterfactuals.
Our baseline model approximates the ﬁrm’s current practices. We use the demand estimates calibrated from the biased forecasts managed by the RM department (Model B), the
ESRMb pricing heuristic, and the observed fares ﬁled by the pricing department.
Next, we correct a single pricing bias and leave others uncorrected. We substitute the
Model B demand estimates for the Model E demand estimates. This corrects for persistently biased forecasts. We leave the set of fares used in the heuristic ﬁxed.
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In the third counterfactual, we use the biased forecasts (Model B) but alter the fares
inputted to the algorithm. We adjust the pricing menus so that they are tailored to the
demand forecast. Using the insights from Section 8.1, we set the minimum price of the
menu to be the price that solves M R = 0. We then increase fares by scaling prices from 1×
to 2.5× the minimum price spanning the number of observed buckets for each route. This
counterfactual simulates coordination between the fares ﬁled by the pricing departure—a
group that does not forecast demand, with the revenue management department—a group
that forecasts demand but does not select fares.
Finally, we address frictions introduced by both the RM and pricing departments. We
use the unbiased forecasts (Model E) along with fares coordinated with Model E demands
using the procedure just outlined.
EMSR-b is a heuristic and is itself biased (Wollmer, 1992) because it does not consider
substitute products. To account for substitutes, we also consider counterfactuals where
prices are determined by solving a dynamic pricing problem. We follow the dynamic pricing (DP) problem in Williams (2021), where a ﬁrm selects a price for each ﬂight from a
discrete set of prices that maximizes its current and expected future proﬁts. We assume that
the ﬁrm solves

Vt (C t , pt ) = max Ret (C t , pt ) + EVt +1 (C t +1 , pt +1 | C t , pt ) ,
p ∈Pt

where C t is the vector of remaining capacity for each ﬂight offered in that time period, pt
is the vector of prices the ﬁrm selects, and R te (C t , pt ) is the ﬁrm’s expected ﬂow revenue.
These value functions are speciﬁc to a route and departure date.
We consider two versions of the DP. We ﬁrst simulate pricing for each ﬂight independently, assuming other ﬂights will be priced at the lowest priced fare. This is analogous to
how we proceed with EMSR-b. We then consider a multi-product DP and limit ourselves
to | J | = 2 due to the dimensionality of the more complicated environments. Our DP results
are thus based on a selected set of routes (and departure dates). We use the coordinated
fare menus derived under Model B and Model E as inputs. As before, these fares may not
be optimal, especially when the ﬁrm prices substitute products.
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9.2 Counterfactual Implementation
For each counterfactual, we simulate ﬂights based on the empirical distribution of observed
remaining capacity 120 days before departure. For each vector of initial remaining capacities, we then draw preferences and arrival rates given our demand estimates (Model E). We
simulate 10,000 ﬂights for each initial capacity, demand combination. Like our demand
model, we do not endogenize connecting (or ﬂow) bookings. Therefore, we handle connecting bookings through exogenous decreases in remaining capacity, based on Poisson
rates estimated using changes in observed remaining capacity not due to nonstop bookings.17 Consumers are assumed to arrive in a random order within a period. If demand
exceeds remaining capacity, consumers are offered seats in the order they arrive. That is,
if the lowest-priced fare has a single seat and is sold immediately, the next arriving consumer within a period is offered the next least-expensive fare. Note that this differs from
our demand model where all consumers are assumed to pay the same price within a period.
However, because arrival rates are low, consumers very rarely pay different prices in our
simulations. This is consistent with the data as well.18

9.3 Welfare Comparison and Addressing Organizational Frictions
We report our main counterfactual results in Table 3. Our baseline model—used to approximate present day airline pricing practices—is shown in the ﬁrst row. We normalize
this baseline to 100% for all welfare measures (consumer surplus leisure and business, revenues, and welfare). Rows two through four present counterfactuals in which a single or
multiple pricing biases are corrected. Results are reported in percentage differences.
We ﬁnd that correcting a single pricing friction but not others leaves outcomes largely
unchanged. As the table shows, in rows two and three, all numbers are close to 100% (except scenario 2, C SL ). Consider using the unbiased forecasts with observed fares (scenario
17 Alternatively,

we could subtract off observed connecting bookings from the initial capacity condition.
However, this constrains initial capacity and results in higher prices than what we observe in the data.
18 We remove seven markets from our analysis that are estimated to have inelastic demand throughout time.
These markets feature very low arrival rates and a very high percentage of zeros (over 95%). Our results are
robust to including these routes, though the average revenue gains are over 5% higher with the inelastic routes
included.
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Table 3: Counterfactual Estimates and a Comparison to Present Practices
Counterfactual

C SL

1)

Observed Fares and Biased Forecasts

2)

C SB

Re v

W

100.0 100.0

100.0

100.0

Coordinated Fares Given Biased Forecast

72.5

103.4

94.1

98.3

3)

Unbiased Forecasts Given Observed Fares

99.8

99.9

101.6

100.5

4)

Coordinated Fares and Unbiased Forecasts 118.0

65.6

117.2

87.1

Note: In counterfactual (1), we approximate current pricing practices. Counterfactual (2) and (3) address a single organizational team
bias, but leave others in place. Finally, in counterfactual (4), we consider a scenario in which RM and pricing department decisions are
coordinated.

3). Although Model E demands differ greatly from Model B, the reason that the counterfactuals produce similar outcomes is because EMSR-b generally expects that future demand
can be accommodated with remaining capacity and both data generating processes. Because the opportunity cost of capacity is estimated by the algorithm to be low, EMSR-b
typically allocates units to the lowest ﬁled fare. This is also observed in the data. The lowest ﬁled fare in scenarios (1) and (3) coincide, hence, outcomes are very similar. Scenario
(2) produces similar results because the coordinates fares based on the incorrect forecast
assign the lowest ﬁled fare to be reasonably close to observed fares. In particular, because
ﬁrm beliefs place consumer types closer together and the optimal static price early on is
higher than observed fares. This lowers leisure consumer surplus. On the other hand, the
fare grid closer to departure contains fares slightly lower than observed, causing business
surplus to increase slightly. The combined effects of pricing according to the incorrect
demand curves results in revenues that are lower than baseline.
When the unbiased forecast is used with price menus coordinated to that unbiased forecast, outcomes are very different. This is shown in row (4). Recall that passenger types are
farther apparent in terms of preferences according to Model E estimates. Because capacity is often not constrained, coordinates fares early on tend to be lower, and coordinated
fares later on tend to be much higher. This leads to lower transacted prices among leisure
consumers, increases output and leisure consumer surplus. Business consumers are made
signiﬁcantly worse off in scenario (4) because the ﬁled fares are increasing over time, tailored to capture increasing willingness to pay, as shown in Figure 9. Revenues increase by
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17% due to increased price targeting; overall, dead-weight loss also rises in the markets
studied. Correcting both sources of mispricing has a complementary effect.
One concern with Model E is that it assumes the ﬁrm knows preferences and arrivals
rates in advance. To address how sensitive our results are to these assumptions, we consider an alternative behavioral model where the ﬁrm has “persistently average beliefs,” or
where the ﬁrm prices according to avg(λ) and avg(β ). The ﬁrm knows γ and α in this
counterfactual. We ﬁnd that even with average beliefs, results are similar to scenario (4) in
Table 3, with a 15% increase in revenues. Essentially, knowing the average change in willingness to pay over time is very important, much more so than day of the week variation in
preferences and arrival rates. Correcting beliefs about the average shape and evolution of
demand—when paired with coordinated fare options—is sufﬁcient to improve revenues.
Table 4: Counterfactual Estimates under an Alternative Pricing System
Counterfactual
C SL
C SB
Re v
W
4)

Pricing heuristic EMSR-b

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

5)

Single- J Dynamic Pricing

95.0

99.0

100.6

99.6

6)

Multi- J Dynamic Pricing

93.3

97.1

100.9

98.8

Note: In counterfactual (4) prices are set using EMSR-b with Model E and the coordinated price menus. Counterfactual (5), endogenously sets prices for each ﬂight independently using the DP. Finally, counterfactual (6) we jointly set prices of all products in the same
market using the DP.

In Table 4, we compare EMSR-b under scenario (4) to models of dynamic pricing
that also use these inputs. We report two rows after our EMSR-b results corresponding
to the situation where the ﬁrm optimizes ﬂight prices individually and one in which the
ﬁrm prices ﬂights jointly. Outcomes are normalized to ESMR-b. We estimate marginally
lower consumer surplus and slightly higher revenues under dynamic pricing. These results
are not due to the discrete nature of prices—implementing a continuous-price version for
single ﬂight markets yields quantitatively similar results.
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9.4 Discussion
Our descriptive evidence and counterfactual results suggest the ﬁrm has the ability to extract additional surplus by raising prices but has chosen not to do so. Note that the ﬁrm’s
current prices practices are rational if the costs of adjusting the pricing inputs are sufﬁciently high, and our estimates of the revenue gains provide a lower bound of these costs.
Our analysis suggests coordinating fares to an unbiased forecast results in the largest revenue gains—more so than changing the pricing technology or moving to continuous prices.
Implementing these changes would require revising demand estimates ﬁrm-wide and addressing span of control to allow coordination in fares chosen by the pricing department to
the forecast maintained by the RM department.
On the other hand, our results may provide evidence of “behavioral ﬁrms." The fact that
optimal prices are signiﬁcantly higher than current ones may suggest experiments could fail
to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay, or the ﬁrm may be experimenting too little. We
ﬁnd some support for the latter possibility. Our search data allow us to see experiments run
on the airline’s website. We can conﬁrm there has been very limited experimentation during
the sample period. Although it is possible that the ﬁrm has long-run demand considerations
in mind when determining prices (supporting lower prices), recall that the forecasts are
persistently biased upward and in general understate (overstate) the number of low (high)
priced tickets sold. Moreover, the ﬁrm reacts to observed demand shocks which affect
forecasted demand for neighboring departures. Our interpretation of the data is the ﬁrm’s
pricing technologies aim to maximize short-run revenues.
Recall that our analysis focuses on routes where the air carrier is the only airline providing nonstop service. It may be the case that the ﬁrm is choosing to offer lower prices
in these markets as a strategic response to the threat of an additional entrant (Goolsbee and
Syverson, 2008). We have abstracted away from such dynamic considerations. The fact
that our documented biases also occur in markets with direct competitors may suggest this
hypothesis is not correct.
Finally, the ﬁrm may be concerned about potential regulatory oversight with optimal
prices. Our demand estimates suggest more pronounced change in demand elasticity across
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the booking period, so optimal prices lead to increased segmentation across consumers. It
may be that the ﬁrm is concerned about backlash of “price gouging” as observed in other
contexts, including in ride share and retailing.

10

Conclusion

In this paper, we how organizational boundaries affect pricing decisions at a large U.S.
airline. We ﬁrst document several ways in which a sophisticated pricing system does not
react to some key market fundamentals. For example, the pricing system uses persistently
biased forecasts and frequently sets price on the inelastic side of the demand curves the
ﬁrm believes it faces. We attribute these pricing frictions to the different organizational
teams responsible for managing pricing inputs.
We estimate a structural demand model and conduct counterfactual experiments using
a pricing heuristic that closely approximates what the ﬁrm uses in practice. We show that
the current pricing algorithm is effective at ﬁlling seats, but could extract more revenue.
Addressing pricing frictions individually does not substantially change market outcomes.
However, if teams coordinate on algorithm inputs, we estimate strong complementary effects on organizational outcomes. The ﬁrm can more effectively optimize on price and
doing so may increase dead-weight loss.
Beyond airlines, our results highlight the difﬁculty ﬁrms may have in designing organizational structures around data and algorithms. When algorithms are complex and require
numerous inputs, it may be infeasible for a single organizational team to monitor and manage all inputs. When ﬁrms delegate tasks to teams, and teams have distinct boundaries, this
may prohibit potential complementarities in data-driven decision making.
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A

Details on the Pricing Heuristic, EMSR-b

We approximate the solution to a dynamic pricing (DP) problem using a well-known
heuristic in operations research, Expected Marginal Seat Revenue-b or EMSR-b (Belobaba, 1987). The heuristic was developed in order to avoid solving highly complex dynamic
pricing problems. The heuristic simpliﬁes the ﬁrm’s decision in each period by aggregating
all future sales before the deadline into a single future period. It also simpliﬁes the demand
system to be for only a single product, so competitive effects cannot be considered. We
describe this process below and show how to incorporate Poisson demand in EMSR-b. It is
important to note that EMSR-b provides an allocation over a given ﬁnite set of prices, instead of providing the optimal price itself given any state of the world. EMSR-b associates
each price with a fare-class then chooses a maximal number of sales that can be made to
each fare-class. This means that consumers may face different prices within a single pricing
period when one class is closed and a higher priced class opens.

A.1 Littlewood’s Rule
EMSR-b is a generalization of Littlewood’s rule, which is a simple case where a ﬁrm prices
two time periods uses two fare classes. A ﬁrm with a ﬁxed capacity of goods (seats) wants
to maximize revenue across two periods, where leisure (more elastic) consumers arrive
in the ﬁrst period and business (less elastic) consumers arrive in the second period. The
ﬁrm sets a cap on the number of seats b it is willing to sell in the ﬁrst period to leisure
passengers. This rule returns a maximum number of seats for leisure when the price to
both leisure and business customers has already been decided; it does not determine optimal
pricing.
The solution equates the price of a seat sold in the ﬁrst period (to leisure travelers) to
the opportunity cost of lowering capacity for sales in the second period (business travelers).
Given prices pL , pB , capacity C , and the arrival CDF of business travelers FB , Littlewood’s
rule equates the fare ratio to the probability that business class sells out. The fare ratio is
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the marginal cost of selling the seat to leisure (the lower revenue pL ) which is set equal to
the marginal beneﬁt—the probability that the seat would not have sold if left for business
customers only. Littlewood’s rule is given by
1 − FB (C − b ) =

pL
.
pB

This equation can then be solved for b , the maximum number of seats to sell to leisure
customers in period one. This solution is exact if consumers arrive in two separate groups
and there are only two time periods and two consumer types.

A.2 EMSR-b Algorithm
The EMSR-b algorithm (Belobaba, 1987) extends Littlewood’s rule to multiple fare levels
or classes. For each fare class, all fare classes with higher fares are aggregated into a single
fare-class called the “super-bucket.” Once this bucket is formed, Littlewood’s rule applies,
and can be done for each fare class iteratively. Rather than just comparing leisure and
business classes, the algorithm now weights the choice of selling a lower fare-class ticket
against an average of all higher fare classes.
We apply the algorithm for K sorted fare-classes such that p1 > p2 > ... > pK . Each fare
class has independent demand with a distribution Fk . Under our speciﬁcation, the demand
for each fare class is distributed Poisson with mean µk that is given by future arrivals times
the share of the market exclusive to that bucket.
The super-bucket is a single-bucket placeholder for a weighted average of all higher
fare-class buckets. Independent Poisson demand simpliﬁes this calculation, as the sum of
independent Poisson distributions is itself Poisson. The mean of the super-bucket is the sum
of the mean of each higher fare-class bucket. The price of the super-bucket is a weighted
average of the price of each higher-fare class, using the means as the weight.
For each fare class, Littlewood’s Rule is then applied with the fare-class taking the
place of leisure travel, and the super-bucket in place of business travel. It is assumed that
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all future arrivals appear in a single day. The algorithm then describes a set of fare-class
limits bk that deﬁne the maximum number of sales for each class before closing that fare
class. We denote the remaining capacity of the plane at any time by C . The algorithm uses
the following pseudo-code:
for t > 2 do
for k ← K to 1 by −1 do
i) Compute un-allocated capacity Ck ,t = C −

PK
i =k

bi ,

ii) Construct the super-bucket
µs b =

k −1
X

µi ,

ps b

i =1

k −1
1 X
=
pi µi ,
µs b i =1

Fs b ∼ Poisson(µs b ),

iii) Apply Littlewood’s Rule using the super-bucket distribution as the demand for
business

§


ª
pk
Ck ,t − bk = min Fs b −1 1 −
, Ck ,t .
ps b

end
end
In the case where t = 1, dynamics are no longer important, so there is no longer a need
to trade off based on the opportunity cost. As a result, we limit the fare of the highest
revenue class to all remaining capacity, and set limits of all other classes to zero.
A.2.1 Fare Class Demand
What remains is computing the mean µk for each fare class bucket. We detail the process
in this section. Demand in each market is an independent Poisson with arrival rate exp(λtt +
λdd )s j (p ). Note that this p is a vector of the prices of all ﬂights in the market. We assume

that the ﬁrm believes other ﬂights will be priced at their historic average over the departure
date and day before departure. This allows us to construct a residual demand function s j (p j )
that is a function of the price of the current ﬂight only. We will treat this as the demand for
4

the ﬂight at a given bucket’s price for the remainder of this section.
Each fare class has a set price pk , at any time t , departure date d we will see exp(λtt +
λdd ) arrivals, of which s (pk ) are willing to purchase a fare for bucket k . However, s (pk −1 )

are willing to purchase a fare for bucket k −1 as well, since they will buy at the higher price


pk −1 . Only exp(λtt + λdd ) st (pk ) − st (pk −1 ) are added by the existence of this fare class with

price pk < pk −1 . Note that this is a ﬂow quantity—the amount of purchases in time t , but
EMSR-B requires stock quantities: How many will purchase over the remaining lifetime
of the sale?
What is the distribution of future purchases then? Each day t is an independent Poisson
process split by the share function. Independent split Poisson processes are still Poisson,
so we may compute the mean of purchases solely in a fare class by summing arrivals over
future time t , and taking the difference in shares between price pk and pk −1 . For time t
and departure date d , the stock demand for fare-class k is given by
t
X



exp(λit + λdd ) st (pk ) − st (pk −1 ) ,

i =1

where st (p0 ) = 0 for notational parsimony.
This demand distribution is only used to compute the super-bucket demand distribution.
Note that we only include future stock demand in the super bucket, and thus only sum
arrivals until time t − 1. For fare-class k . The super bucket’s stock demand is given by
µs b =

 t −1
X


exp(λit

+ λdd )si (pk −1 )

i =1

ps b =

k −1
t −1


1X X
pj
exp(λit + λdd ) si (p j ) − si (p j −1 ) .
µ j =1 i =1

The updated pseudo-code for the EMSR-b algorithm is:
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for t > 2 do
for k ← K to 1 by −1 do
i) Compute un-allocated capacity Ck ,t = C −

PK
i =k

bi (t ),

ii) Construct the super-bucket
µs b =

 t −1
X


exp(λit + λdd ) si (pk −1 ),

i =1

ps b

t −1
k −1


1 X X
=
pj
exp(λit + λdd ) s (p j ) − s (p j −1 ) ,
µs b j =1 i =1

Fs b ∼ Poisson(µs b ),

iii) Apply Littlewood’s Rule using the super-bucket distribution as the demand for
business.

§
Ck ,t − bk (t ) = min Fs b

−1


ª

pk
, Ck ,t .
1−
ps b

end
end
For t = 1 we continue to allocate the highest revenue fare class to the entire remaining
capacity. Note that for this allocation rule, bk (t , d ) is a function of time since the arrivals are
changing over time. This policy can be computed for each time t and remaining capacity
c , for all departure dates d and arrival rates λ.

B Route Selection
We use publicly available data to select markets to study. The DB1B data are provided
by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and contain a 10% sample of tickets sold. The
DB1B does not include the date purchased nor the date traveled and is at the quarterly
level. Because the DB1B data contain information solely for domestic markets, we limit
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our analysis to domestic markets as well. Furthermore, we use the air carrier’s deﬁnition
of markets to combine airports within some geographies.
Figure 10: Nonstop, One-stop and Connecting Trafﬁc
Destination
Connecting

Origin

One-stop


Note: We use the term nonstop to denote the sold black line, or passengers solely traveling between Origin, Destination . Unless
otherwise noted, we will use directional trafﬁc, labeled O → D . Non-directional trafﬁc is speciﬁed as O ↔ D . The blue, dashed lines
represent passengers ﬂying on O ↔ D , but traveling to or from a different origin or destination. Finally, one-stop trafﬁc are passengers
ﬂying on O ↔ D , but through a connecting airport.

We consider two measures of trafﬁc ﬂows when selecting markets: trafﬁc ﬂying nonstop
and trafﬁc that is non-connecting. Both of these metrics are informative for measuring
the substitutability of other ﬂight options (one-stop, for example) as well as the diversity
of tickets sold for the ﬂights studied (connecting trafﬁc). Figure 10 provides a graphical
depiction of trafﬁc ﬂows in airline networks that we use to construct the statistics. We
consider directional trafﬁc ﬂows from a potential origin and destination pair that is served
nonstop by our air carrier. The ﬁrst metric we calculate is the fraction of trafﬁc ﬂying
from O → D nonstop versus one or more stops. This compares the solid black line to the
dashed orange line. Second, we calculate the fraction of trafﬁc ﬂying from O → D versus
O → D → C . This compares the solid black line to the dashed blue line.

Figure 11 presents summary distributions of the two metrics for the markets (ODs) we
select. In total, we select 407 ODs for departure dates between Q3:2018 and Q3:2019. The
top row measures the fraction of nonstop and connecting trafﬁc for tickets sold by our our
carrier. The left plot shows that, conditional on the air carrier operating nonstop ﬂights
between OD, an overwhelming fraction of consumers purchase nonstop tickets instead of
purchasing one-stop connecting ﬂights. The right panel shows that fraction of consumers
who are not connecting to other cities either before or after ﬂying on segment OD. There is
7

Figure 11: Route Selection Using Bureau of Transportation Statistics Data
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Note: Density plots over the fraction of nonstop trafﬁc and the fraction of non-connecting trafﬁc for the selected routes using DB1B data.
"Within" means passengers ﬂying on our air carrier. "Total" means all air carriers on a given origin-destination pair. Within nonstop and
total nonstop coincide if our carrier is the only carrier ﬂying nonstop.

signiﬁcant variation across markets, with the average being close to 50%.
Figure 12: DB1B Comparison
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Note: (a) A scatter plot of the fraction nonstop and fraction non-connecting for all origin-destination pairs served by our air carrier. The
blue dots show selected markets; the orange dots show non-selected markets. (b) Kernel density plots of all fares in the DB1B data for
our air carrier; the blue line shows the density for our selected markets.
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The bottom panel repeats the statistics but replaces the denominator of the fractions
with the sum of trafﬁc ﬂows across all air carriers in the DB1B. Both distributions shift to
the left because of existence of competitor connecting ﬂights and sometimes direct competitor ﬂights. In nearly 75% of the markets we study, our air carrier is the only ﬁrm
providing nonstop service. Our structural analysis will only consider single carrier markets.
In Figure 12-(a), we show a scatter plot of the fraction of nonstop trafﬁc and the fraction
of non-connecting trafﬁc for all origin-destination pairs offers by our air carrier in the
DB1B. The orange dots depict routes non-selected markets and the blue dots show the
selected markets. We see some dispersion in selected markets, however this is primarily
on non-connecting trafﬁc. An overwhelming fraction of the selected markets have high
nonstop trafﬁc, although this is true in the sample broadly. Essentially, conditional on
the air carrier providing nonstop service, most passengers choose nonstop itineraries. In
Figure 12-(b) we show the distribution of purchased fares in the DB1B for our carrier along
with our selected markets. The distribution of prices for the selected sample are slightly
shifted to the right, which makes sense since we primarily select markets where the air
carrier is the only airline providing nonstop service.

B.1 Estimation Sample Comparison
Our estimation sample contains 39 markets. Compared to the overall sample, these routes
tend to be smaller in terms of total number of passengers, larger in terms of percentage
of nonstop and non-connecting passengers, and nonstop service is provided only by our
air carrier. We report percentage differences between our estimation routes and the entire
sample for key characteristics below in Table 5. Figure 13 shows a two-way plot of the
fraction of nonstop and non-connecting trafﬁc for the routes selected for estimation relative
to the entire sample.
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Table 5: Estimation Routes Comparison
Characteristic

Percentage Difference from Mean

Number of Nonstop Passengers
Total Number of Passengers
Number of Local Passengers
Fraction of Trafﬁc Nonstop
Fraction of Trafﬁc Non-Connecting

-38.8%
-33.4%
-37.7%
1.02%
5.91%

Note: Statistics calculated using the DB1B data for the years 2018-2019.

Non-con. Traffic Fraction

Figure 13: Route Estimation Selection using DB1B Data
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Note: A scatter plot of the fraction nonstop and fraction non-connecting for all origin-destination pairs served by our air carrier. The
blue dots show markets used for estimation; the orange dots show non-selected markets.

C

Demand Estimation Procedure

We provide an overview on the implementation details of each stage the MCMC routine for
demand parameter estimation. Simultaneously drawing from the joint distribution of our
large parameter space is infeasible, therefore, we use a Hybrid Gibbs sampling algorithm.
The algorithm steps are shown below. At each step of the posterior sampler, we sequentially draw from the marginal posterior distribution groups of parameters, conditional on
other parameter draws. Where conjugate prior distributions are unavailable, we use the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, a rejection sampling method that draws from an approximating candidate distribution and keeps draws which have sufﬁciently high likelihood.
Additional detail can be found in Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley, Schwieg, and Williams (2021).
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1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

for c = 1 to C do
Update arrivals λ
Update shares s (·)
Update price coefﬁcients α
Update consumer distribution γ
Update linear parameters β
Update pricing equation η
Update price endogeneity parameters Σ
end for
Algorithm 1: Hybrid Gibbs Sampler

(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Gibbs)
(Gibbs)
(Gibbs)

Sampling Arrival Parameters
We start the sampling procedure by drawing from the posterior distribution of arrival parameters, λt ,d . The posterior is derived by deﬁning the joint likelihood of arrivals for each
consumer type and quantities sold, conditional on product shares. Recall that arriving consumers have likelihood based on their type:
A Lt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d (1 − γ̃t )ζLt ),
A Bt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d γ̃t ζBt ),

where γ̃t is the probability a consumer is of the business type as derived from the passenger assignment algorithm, and ζℓt is the fraction of bookings that do not occur on the
direct channel for each consumer type (leisure and business). The purchase likelihood is a
function of shares and arrivals and is equal to


q̃ j ,t ,d ∼ Poisson λt ,d · s j ,t ,d ,
¦
©
q j ,t ,d = min q̃ j ,t ,d , C j ,t ,d .

This directly accounts for censored demand due to ﬁnite capacity. Since arrivals are restricted to be non-negative, we restrict the set of ﬁxed effects by transforming the multi

plicative ﬁxed effects to be of the form λt ,d = exp Wt ,d τ . We select a log-Gamma prior
11

for τ. We sample from the posterior distribution by taking a Metropolis-Hastings draw
from a normal candidate distribution.
Sampling Shares and Utility Parameters
Updating shares. We treat product shares as unobserved, since the market size may
be very small and lead to irreducible measurement error. We use data augmentation to
treat shares as a latent parameter that we estimate. Conditional on all other parameters
(λ, α, γ, β , η, Σ), product shares are an invertible function of the demand shock, ξ. If we
conditioned additionally on ξ, shares would be a deterministic function of data and other
parameter draws. Instead, we leverage the stochastic nature of ξ, which we explicitly parameterize. The distribution of unobserved ξ is the source of variation for constructing a
conditional likelihood for shares:
−1




s j ,t ,d | β , α, γ, X 

ξ j ,t ,d

=f

υ j ,t ,d

= p j ,t ,d − Z j0,t ,d η



κ = k ∼ N iid (0, Σk )


such that Σk =



σ2
 k ,11
ρk

ρk
σk2 ,22

.

Here, κ is a mapping from days to departure t to an interval (block) of time. That is,
the pricing error and the demand shock have a block-speciﬁc joint normal distribution.
Conditional on the pricing shock υ, the distribution of ξ, fξ j ,t ,d (·), is

ξ υ, κ = k ∼ N

ρk υ
σk2 ,11

, σk2 ,22 −

ρk2
σk2 ,11


.


The density of shares is then given by the transformation f s j ,t ,d (x ) = fξ j ,t ,d f −1 (x ) · Jξ j ,t ,d →s j ,t ,d
where Jξ j ,t ,d →s j ,t ,d is the Jacobian matrix of model shares with respect to ξ. To produce the
full joint conditional likelihood of shares, we also include the mass function for sales,
which are a product of shares and arrivals:
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−1

,

 

ρk υ
σk2 ,11

−1

(t ,d )
f (s j ,t ,d ) −
Y Y JY
 
ϕ
  s
ρ2
t
j
=1
d
σk2 ,22 − σ2 k





 (λt ,d s j ,t ,d )


exp(−λt ,d s j ,t ,d ) 
 · Jξ→s
q j ,t ,d !

q j ,t ,d

−1

,

k ,11

where ϕ(·) is the standard normal density function. We draw from the posterior based on a
uniform prior distribution and normal candidate Metropolis-Hastings draws.
Updating price coefﬁcients, αB , αL . We construct the conditional likelihood (and thus
the conditional posterior distribution) for α = (αB , αL ) in a similar manner to the product
shares. For any candidate value of price sensitivity, we recover a residual ξ, invert the
demand system, and recover a likelihood. Conditional on λ, shares, η, β , and Σ, we
compute the distribution of ξ and determine the likelihood of a particular draw of α, given
by

 
(t ,d )
Y Y JY
t

d

j =1



ρk υ
σk2 ,11

−1

f (s j ,t ,d ) −
 
ϕ  s
ρ2
σk2 ,22 − σ2 k


 · Jξ→s

−1

,

k ,11

where ϕ(·) is the standard Normal density function. We impose a log-Normal prior on α,
and impose αB < αL to avoid label-switching. To draw from the conditional posterior, we
take a Metropolis-Hasting step using a normal candidate distribution.
Updating the distribution of consumer types, γ.

We allow for the mix of consumer

types to change over the booking horizon t . We deﬁne γ from a sieve estimator of the
booking horizon t , and we sample the sieve coefﬁcients, ψ, according to

γt = Logit G (t )0 ψ ,

where G (t ) is a vector of Bernstein polynomials. The logistic functional form ensures that
the image of γ in the interval (0, 1). The inversion procedure used to construct the likelihood
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is similar to α and shares. It yields a likelihood for sieve coefﬁcients ψ of the form
 
(t ,d )
Y Y JY
t

d

j =1

ρk υ
σk2 ,11

−1

f (s j ,t ,d ) −
 
ϕ  s
ρ2
σk2 ,22 − σ2 k



 · Jξ→s

−1

.

k ,11

We use a uniform prior on ψ, and we sample from the posterior with a Metropolis-Hastings
step using a normal candidate draw.
Updating remaining preferences, β .

To sample the remaining preferences that are

common across consumer types, we impose a normal prior on β , with mean β̄0 and variance V0 . We adjust for price endogeneity to conduct a standard Bayesian regression. Deﬁne
δ j ,t ,d = X j ,t ,d β + ξ j ,t ,d , which is evaluated at the ξ computed in the prior step. We nor-

malize each component of δ by subtracting the expected value of ξ and dividing by its
standard deviation. The normalized
equations have unit variance and are thus conjugate to
s
the normal prior. Let σk ,2|1 =

ρ2

σk2 ,22 − σ2 k be the variance of ξ conditional on υ and Σ.
k ,11

We center and scale δ:
ρ

δ j ,t ,d − σ2 κt υ
κt ,11

σκt ,2|1

=

1

β

σκt ,2|1

X j ,t ,d β̄ + U j ,t ,d ,

where U β ∼ N (0, 1). Then, the posterior distribution of β is N (βN , VN ), where

V0 −1 β0 + X̂ 0 δ̂ ,

−1

βN = (X̂ 0 X̂ + V0 −1 )

−1

VN = (V0 −1 + X̂ 0 X̂ ) ,
X̂ j ,t ,d =
δ̂ =

X j ,t ,d
σκt ,2|1

,
ρ

δ j ,t ,d − σ2 κt υ
κt ,11

σκt ,2|1

.

Given this normalization, we can draw directly from the conditional posterior distribution
of β using a Gibbs step.
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Sampling Price-Endogeneity Parameters
Updating pricing equation, η.

We use a linear pricing equation of the form
p j ,t ,d = Z j ,t ,d η + υ j ,t ,d .

Conditional on shares, λ, γ, α, and β , ξ is known. Therefore, we use the conditional
distribution of υ given ξ to perform another Bayesian linear regression in a similar manner
s

to β . We impose a Normal prior and normalize prices. Deﬁne σκt ,1|2 =
follows that

ρ

p j ,t ,d − σκκt,22 ξ j ,t ,d
t

σκt ,1|2

=

1
σκt ,1|2

ρ2

σκ2 t ,11 − σ2 κt . It
κt ,22

η

X j ,t ,d η̄ + U j ,t ,d ,

where U η ∼ N (0, 1). Just as we did for β , we can draw from the posterior of η from a linear
regression with unit variance. This step allows us to directly sample from the posterior of
η rather than using a Metropolis-Hastings step.

Updating the price endogeneity parameters, Σ. We ﬂexibly model the joint distribution
of ξ and υ by allowing for a route-speciﬁc, time-varying correlation structure. We divide
the booking horizon into four equally sized 30-day periods, and each block is indexed k .
We restrict the price endogeneity parameters Σ, which determine the joint distribution of
ξ, υ, to be identical within these blocks. Within each block, the pricing and demand residual

follow the same joint distribution. We draw the variance of this normal distribution with a
typical Inverse-Wishart parameterization. Our prior for Σk is I W (ν, V ) where k refers to
the block. Deﬁne the vector Yk = (υ, ξ) to be the collection of residual pairs conditional on
block k , and Yk ∼ N (0, Σk ). The posterior for the covariance matrix Σk is then
Σk ∼ I W (ν + nk , V + Yk0 Yk ).

Block k has nk observations. This Gibbs step is repeated for each block k , and we sample
directly from the conditional posteriors of Σ.
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